An introductory approach to a comparative and theoretical study of some basic legal concepts in Russian (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) criminal law by Schembri, Ġużeppi
1989 63 
AN INTRODUCTORY APPROACH TO A COMPARATIVE 
AND THEORl!TICAL STUDY OF SOME BASIC LEGAL 
CONCEPTS IN RUSSIAN (RUSSIAN SOVIET 
FEDERATIVE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC) CRIMINAL LAW. 
DR. GUZEPPI SCHEMBRI 
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This comparative essay is also an objective criticism of a Soviet school 
of law and its western counterpart, both believing that substantially, Soviet 
law is no law at all: the former manifests this belief through its supposition 
that Soviet law is radically and principally a new 'substantia', a completely 
new 'essence'. Thus, this school rejects any possibility of evolution, of 
transformation, of mutual influence between different cultures. 
This attitude was greatly enhanced after the f917 revolution by the 
dogmatic classist character of this school which in fact successfully changed 
old terminology to a new one; thus the RSFSR Criminal Code of 1922 excludes 
the concept of 'mens rea' and the concept of punishment but only by means 
of new terminology i.e. measures of social protection having a judicial-corrective 
character took the place of the term 'punishment'. But as correctly asserted 
by Pashukanis E.B. this did not change the essence of facts. 1. 
While this Soviet school based its theoretical foundations on the political 
and legal necessity of destroying the 'old' and building the 'new', its western 
partner, ironically enough, upheld the same thesis, but basing itself on an 
incorrect analysis of the situation evolving in revolutionary Russia concluded 
that a sine lege society was in formation-a society without law. 
According to the author of this essay, Soviet law, although creating the 
basis of essentially novel legal provisions and a new legal culture (in the same 
manner as the Napoleonic legal system did for the XIXc) it also integrally forms 
part, a very active part of Continental legal culture and as such is neither a 
'sine lege' system nor is it an immune system, nor a system without roots in 
the 'old' continental sense. On the contrary, Soviet law is· an integral, 
evolutionary part of this same culture. 
The Continental character of the Soviet Russian Criminal Code is formally 
explicit in the traditional, 'old', structural differentiation of the Code itself. 
Thus, it is divided in a general and special part, the former giving the basic 
structure of positive criminal law, while the latter provides for the special 
character involving the crime composition of specific acts, qualified as being 
positive criminal acts. Thus the former includes:- the objectives and principles 
of the Criminal Code, criminal liability, general rules about the application 
of punishments, the will and age of the offender, attempted offence, impunity, 
necessary and self-defence, preparatory acts, voluntary desistince, complicity, 
The author is using the word Russian for several reasons one being the fact that this essay is based 
on the Russian Federation (RSFSR) 1961 Criminal Code enacted by the Supreme Soviet of the 
Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic on the basis of the Fundamental Criminal Legislations 
of 1959-61. 
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exemption from punishment etc. An important consideration is the fact that 
the Russian Criminal Code defines each concept. It defines "Crime". One 
also finds definitions of intention, of negligence, defence, extreme necessity, 
complicity and others. 
As stated above, the special part, as in all Continental codes, is dedicated 
to the specific crime composition of acts qualified as criminal acts - state crimes, 
crimes against socialist property, crimes against the life, health, freedom and 
honour of the person, crimes against the political and labour rights of citizens, 
crimes against the personal property of citizens, economic crimes, crimes against 
public trust, crimes against the administration of justice, crimes against public 
peace, crimes against security, social order and against 'the health of the 
population, military crimes, and others. 
It is not our intention here to delve deeper into each provision. Suffice 
it to say that such a formal structure is already a very noted characteristic of 
the Continental legal culture inherited by the Soviet Russian system. 
Limiting ourselves to the general part, one immediately notices that Soviet 
Russian criminal law is fundamentally based on a defined qualification of the 
crime composition of each act, which thus is determined as being a criminal 
act if so defined by the state. 
Thus, we find here a very interesting position: whereas in Malta doctrine 
is radically differentiated from positive law, this doctrine is in the Russian system 
positivised i.e. made as an integral part of positive law. In other words, one 
finds a codification of what in our system we are habituated to interpret as 
being pure doctrine. What is doctrine in our system becomes positive law in 
the Soviet Russian system. 
Hence, differing from the Maltese Code, sec. I. of the Russian Code 
instead of providing for the penal laws as in the Maltese Code, defines in a 
positive manner the tasks of the RSFSR Criminal Code i.e. to protect the social 
order, the political and economic system, socialist property individual rights 
and freedoms and the whole socialist legal order, from criminal encroach­
ments. 2
Thus, what for the normative school of legal science seem to be extra­
legal concepts are themselves normitivised and made positive through their 
enactment in a Criminal Code. 
What for the Maltese system is part of doctrine, becomes in the Russian 
system a part of positive law. The above definition is in fact an expansion of 
Carrara's definition - 'promulgata per proteggere la sicurezza <lei cittadini' 
- and in which definition the word 'subjects' is used precisely to convey that
crime is punished by the state because it injures also the community at
large ... " 3
Sec. I of the RSFSR Code also underlines that in order to implement this 
above mentioned enactment, the Code must determine which acts are to be 
so qualified and their corresponding punishments. Thus sec. I gives a positive 
character to doctrine and formalises its normative character. In order thus to 
afford such "protection" it is the Criminal Code that determines which 
dangerous social acts are criminal. 
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Protection as a positive legal concept, is defined as the "tutela" of the 
objects enlisted in the article concerned is implemented by means of applying 
the norms found in the Criminal Code. 
Social order includes the system of social relations obtaining in the 
economic field, in social-class and in political spheres. This latter unit is 
concretely interpreted as including the Communist Party of the USSR, the 
Soviet Government, social organizations, collectives and independent social 
organizations. 
The USSR economic system reflects the character and form of property 
and the corresponding system of distribution of wealth. 
Besides these objects to be defended and protected sec. I singles out 
'socialist property' i.e. the fundamental constitutional basis of the USSR society. 
This property is reflected in the legal entities of state and "kolhkoz" property, 
together with union property and co-operative property. 
The individualisation of this specific item being afforded special protection 
is conditioned by s.10 of the USSR Constitution. 
The next object to be protected is the person, defined as an active subject 
in the construction and establishment of society; the concept of person includes 
also a subject incapable of participating in same. Citizens are so qualified by 
birth, by acceptance, and by other means regulated by the "Law on USSR 
Citizenship" (1978).· Their protected rights are those provided for by the 
Constitution - equality in the economic, political, social and cultural life, sex 
equality and race equality. The rights afforded protection are the right to work, 
to rest, to health, to education, to use cultural benefits, and to social benefits, 
and others. 
Citizens' freedoms include the traditional freedoms of conscience, of 
meetings, demonstrations, of expression, of scientific, technological and artistic 
creativity. 
The last element provided for by sec. I. is ''the whole socialist legal order'' 
meaning all the positive norms regulating socialist social relations. 
Thus, according to sec. I. all the above units are afforded protection against 
criminal encroachments, the latter expression interpreted as meaning the action 
(commission and omission) having all the necessary elements composing the 
crime-structure, which is thereby qualified as such by the Code. 
Thus, as one can see the Soviet Russian Code in fact includes concepts 
which are qualified by the normative school, especially by Beling, Binding and 
Y escheck, as concepts ''having nothing to do with law''. 4
One may recall here ·that the normative school excludes concepts such as 
'social danger', since these have a subjective-assessive character and hence do 
not belong to law. 
Such concepts' normativisation in a Code should naturally create 
theoretical problems to the German normative school. 
The Maltese-Italian school, although based on and implies such objectivity 
as that found in the Soviet Code, does not expressly 'de jure condito' provide 
such a character in its system of law. The Maltese legislator on the other hand 
opted for an adjective formal definition of criminal action as one prosecuted 
before the courts of criminal jurisdiction, by the Government of Malta, without 
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positively providing for the requisite of social danger, of socially, harmful 
consequences (v.sec.3.2.,4.I.) although such concepts are integral, basic and 
fundamental in the legal system's doctrine. 
After defining the objectives of the RSFSR Criminal Code, the Code 
defines the parametres of criminal liability (sec.3), or rather the basis of criminal 
liability, which is also left out from being 'codified' in the Maltese system: yet 
the codified Russian definition is directly based on the same doctrinal concepts 
accepted by the Maltese school. 
Thus, criminal liability arises only if a person is guilty of committing a 
criminal act and the Russian Code qualifies this as being possible either 
"intentionally or through negligence". That is, only a person who is guilty 
of committing a crime' is defined by the Code itself as one committing either 
intentionally or by negligence a socially, dangerous act provided for by criminal 
law. 
Doctrinally this aspect tallies with the Maltese school, but the latter leaves 
this aspect in the doctrinal field, while the Soviet system again as above 
mentioned, 'codifies' the same. 
Such a dichotomy exists in all these relative aspects of both schools. Again, 
in the Maltese system, the Code refrains from giving any definition of 
'negligence' and 'intention', and of course as already stated does not touch 
the definition of criminal liability, being content with subjecting the concept 
to defect of will, this being ground to exemption from criminal responsibility. 
The doctrinal 'res ipsa in se dolum habet' is only implied through case-law. 
On the contrary, sec.8 of the RSFSR Code defines the complex limitations 
of 'intention', defining an intentional criminal act as that situation when the 
person committing the crime comprehends, is conscious of the socially 
dangerous character of his act (commission or omission) and foresees the 
dangerous soci
a
l consequences and either desired them or consciously allowed 
their coming into being. Such definition, as one can note, unites direct and 
lateral intentions and is directly derived from the Italian classical school and 
accepted by the Maltese legal system; 5
The intellectual moment is the consciousness of the dangerous and harmful 
character of the acts and the foreseeing of the results, the 'volere' is the striving 
towards the desired end or consciously permitting such results. The correlation 
between this 'conoscere and volere' may produce direct intention i.e. being 
conscious of the socially dangerous character of the act, foreseeing the 
inevitability or possibility of the results and desiring same. Or this correlation 
may also prodt;1ce lateral intention i.e. conscious of the socially dangerous 
character of the act, forseeing the possibility of its consequences, he may not 
desire ( although at the same time he may be consciously permitting) their 
coming into being. The latter is close to Carrara's positive indirect intention. 
Sec.9 further qualifies 'negligence' as an act committed by a person who 
foresaw the possibility of socially dangerous results, but carelessly calculated 
on their being prevented. This gives rise to criminal presumption. Negligence 
also includes the situation in which a person does not foresee the possibility 
of his act'·s consequences but should.have and could have foreseen them. This 
is termed criminal negligence. 
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The first part of the above Russian section deals with the situation in which 
negligence is understood as a particular state of mind manifested by a failure 
to be alert: the true nature, circumstances, and consequences of a man's acts 
are prevented from being present in his conciousness. 6 On the other hand, 
the second part of the Russian section deals with negligence as "un atto di 
volonta", "a voluntary failure to take care" and as a voluntary failure to 
foresee." 'Should have' and 'Could have' imply that the Code is not only talking 
on the 'possibility' of foreseeing but also includes the breach of the duty of 
taking care. That is, it includes the failure to foresee that which is foreseeable 
( could) and also the failure to foresee that which ought ot have been foreseen 
(should). 
Sec.3 (criminal liability), sec. 8 (intention) and Sec.9 (negligence) together 
formulate the important postulates of the crime-composition of an act. Criminal 
liability is effected from the moment of the completion of the crime. At this 
point of time one may speak of criminal legal relations ''the subjects of which 
are the official organs representing the state and the criminal (v. Commentaries). 
This relationship is also reflected in sec.4 of the Maltese Code'' ... the criminal 
action is essentially a public action and is vested in the Government by whom 
it is prosecuted in the name of the Republic of Malta, through the Executive 
Police or the Attorney General as the case may be according to law''. 
According to Russian law intention or negligence in the act concerned 
is present only if this same act has all the required ingredients i.e. has a complete 
crime-composition. 
A crime-composition is defined as the totality objective and subjective 
ingredients established by criminal law, characterising the specific socially 
dangerous act as a criminal act. The objective ingredients include (i) the socialist 
social' relations protected by law and against which the particular, specific act 
is directed, i.e. the object of the criminal encroachment. ii. the criminal act 
and the external 'iter' i.e. omission and commission, criminal effects, the legal 
nexus between the act and the results or effects: sometimes time, place and 
means are also included as forming part of the objective side of the 
crime-composition. 
The subjective side of crime-composition articulates the psychic relation 
the person has to the socially dangerous act and its subsequent effects. As stated 
above, this psychological relationship is by Russian law defined a having the 
form of either intention or negligence. In fact ' guilt' is defined by Russian law 
as the psychic, the mental relation of the person to his committing of a socially 
dangerous act defined as such by criminal law. Due to such definition some 
conclude that Russian law does not recognise the Continental concept of 
objective liability, (did not foresee, could not and should not have). 
Motive, objective, personality together with guilt form part of the subjective 
side of the crime-composition. 
It is of outmost importance to repeat that according to Russian law, only 
the totality of all the above mentioned ingredients may give rise to criminal 
liability. 
One, or a couple of the above elements do not constitute the complex 
definition ofliability. There has to be the total sum of each ingredient present 
in the act. 
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Sec.8 goes on to develop sec. 3 by giving a definition of intention (supra). 
As already stated, sec.8 defines two forms of intention: direct and indirect 
intention. 
Direct intention includes the consciousness of the socially dangerous 
character of the act, the foreseeability of the dangerous effects of the act or 
omission and the desire of their coming into being. Direct intention as in the 
Italian-Maltese school is formed of an intellectual and the volition side. The 
former assists in the knowing of the dangerous character and in the foreseeing 
of subsequent effects while the latter is necessary to define the 'desire' of such 
results coming into being. As one can see even here the Soviet Russian school 
of criminal law is very much dependant on the classical Italian source. 
The indirect or lateral intention implies that the offender is conscious of 
the socially dangerous character of his act or omission, he foresees the 
corresponding consequences and effects and consciously permits their coming 
into being. Like the Italian school, the Russian school admits the intellectual 
and volitional elements in this indirect form of intention. 
According to Russian law, indirect intention is possible only in cases of 
material crime-compositions. In formal crime-compositions indirect intention 
is not accepted due to the fact that in the completion of such crime·compositions 
the psychological relationship between the offender and the criminal result is 
impossible to establish. 
The fundamental, basic difference between direct and lateral intention 
is found in the element of volition. In direct intention, this element in material 
crime-compositions is expressed by the explicit desire of t�e coming into being 
of particular results, foreseen either as the sole aim or objective of the actor 
or as a means towards an end. In the case oflateral intention foreseen results 
are not the end, are not the objectives of the offender's acts, are not desired 
nor required as the completion of his objective. 
Russian positive law, although defining Intention as above, does not 
proceed to define specific and generic intent, nor does it define preconceived 
or spontaneous intent although these are accepted by Soviet case·law. 
Sec.9 qualifies n�gligence. A crime is committed through negligence if
the offender foresaw the possibility of the resulting socially dangerous effects 
due to omission or commission, but frivolously (thoughtlessly) relied on their 
prevention or did not foresee the possibility of their coming into being although 
he ought to have (should have) and could have foreseen them. 
Thus Russian law defines two forms of negligence: criminal presumption 
and criminal carelessness. 
The former is carefully worded so as to underline that the psychological 
relationship here is not directed towards the act, but is determined within the 
parameters of the relationship to the socially dangerous results. This obviously 
means that acts in this section do not have the same criminal liability burden 
and as such cannot eg. establish preparation or attempt in crime. 
The offender is not conscious of the real and concrete development of the 
nexus between his behaviour and subsequent results: although he could have 
been conscious if he had used greater mental care. This is very similar to the 
traditional theory propounded by Carmignani and Carrara. According to this 
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school negligence is a subjective fact i.e. a particular state of mind. It essentially 
consists in a failure to be alert, circumspect, or vigilant. The negligent 
wrongdoer is·he does not know it, but would have known it were it not for 
his mental indolence 7• In fact the Russian Code seems to use Carrara' s 
terminology in defining negligence (the former type) as a voluntary failure to 
take care in estimating the probable and foreseeable consequences of one's acts. 
The second form of negligence defined by sec.9 is criminal carelessness, 
whereby the offender did not foresee the possibility of resulting effects although 
he ought to/should have and could have foreseen them. Here the central element 
is the unforeseeability. The element of volition here consists in the fact that 
although the offender had a real possibility to foresee such results, he did not 
act upon his mental capabilities to will the necessary acts necessary to prevent 
such results. 
Thus, in contrast to criminal presumption one notes here the objective 
criteria of ''ought to/should have'' but this is integrated with the subjective 
element of "could have". 
Following lmpallomeni and Maino, the Russian school distinguishes 
between the various degrees of foreseeability opting for an average criteria to 
determine the possibility existing in foreseeing, taking into account such 
elements as the profession, speciality, activity of the offender, the normal 
standard of care expected from a normal person. 
This again is very close to Carrara and to the Maltese school. "When 
we say that the event was unforeseeable, we do not mean that it was 
unforeseeable absolutely. We mean only that it was unforeseeable by the 
standard of care which the law requires every man to use in his actions, ..... the 
amount of prudence or care which the law actually demands is that which is 
reasonable in the circumstances of the particular case ... '' . 8 
'Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege' is effectually enacted in the second 
part of Sec.3. 9 This provision underlines that only a court sentence can define 
and determine guilt. As in many continental systems this section is a reflection 
of constitutional norms. Thus the same principle is provided for in sec. 160 
of the USSR Constitution:· "No one may be adjudged guilty of a crime and 
subjected to punishment as a criminal except by the sentence of a court and 
in conformity with the law". (v. also sec. 151) 11 • • •  in conformity with the law" 
is understood by Soviet jurists as meaning the pronouncing of the sentence 
in observance with all material and procedural criminal law requirements. This 
interprtation is detatable. 
Thus the guilt of every accused person has to be proved in court and 
according to law. Russian law underlines that the system established by law 
for the determination of guilt can only be a court system ·· excluding any other 
organ. Such a situation can be compared with Malta's Constitutional provision 
stating that'' Whenever any person is charged with a criminal 9ffence he shall ... 
be afforded a fair hearing ... by an independent and impartial court established 
by law ... ,
, 
(Sec.39.I. ). 
Unfortunately the qualifications of "fairness", "independence" and 
"impartiality" do not figure in the Soviet Russian version. 
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An interesting digression here can help us understand better this situation.
''When in 1921 the Organizational Bureau of the Party Central Committee 
drafted a circular, which stipulated the right of the Party Committees to impose 
pre-determining instructions on the Courts, Lenin thought the respective 
instructions harmful and insisted on a revision of the circular. And in a well 
known letter to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian 
Communist Party (Bolsheviks), dated March 18, 1922 he wrote this reminder: 
''That it be confirmed to all Gubernia Party Committees that for the slightest 
attempt to influence the courts ... the CC will expel such persons from the 
Party ... ". L. Sobolev, from whose works the above was quoted also states that 
'no heed was paid to Lenin's warning'. 
In fact today the Party's Res.olution "On Legal Reform" stresses that 
it is necessary ... to secure unconditional independence of judges and their 
subordination to law alone, and to define concrete sanctions for interference 
in their activity and contempt of court. 10 
The concept that anything the law does not prohibit is allowed, was recently 
declared as a principle that the XIXth Conference put at the basis of the reform 
of the legal system. 
The Soviet Russian Code, maintaining its positivist character, 'provokes' 
a definition, a positive definition of 'Crime'. 
Primarily it indicates that crime is a violation of the law of the State. 
" .. (act) .. encroaching on socialist legal order .. as provided for by criminal 
law ... ". 
Then it goes on to qualify that such law is promulgated for the protection 
of the safety of the subjects and community; " ... (act) ... encroaching on the 
social structure, its political and economic system, on the socialist property, 
personal and political, labour, property and other rights and freedoms of the 
citizens ... ''. 
This act of encroaching is defined by criminal law as a socially dangerous 
act ( omission or commission). Here one cannot help recalling and not using 
the extension of Carrara' s Classical doctrinal definition which finds its positive 
enactment in the RSFSR Code. (The second part of Carrara's definition can 
be found in sec.3) . 
. But the Soviet Russian Code goes further -- it concretises the concept of 
'safety of the subjects' and besides the objective danger and harm qualified 
by the definition, it also, interestingly enough, includes the normative concept 
of the whole legal order as an element needing the 'tutela'. This implies the 
fundamental normative theoretical elements of 'material unlawfulness' in the 
theory of Yescheck H. and the concept of 'legal good' in Dona A. 11 
Thus, sec. 7 defines Crime as that socially dangerous act (omission or 
commission) qualified by criminal law, encroaching on the USSR social 
structure, its political and economic system, on socialist property, on the person, 
on political, labour, property and other rights and freedoms of citizens and 
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also as that socially dangerous act (provided for by the criminal law) which 
encroaches on the socialist legal order. 
Here the author considers a formally very interesting development from 
sec. 1 concerning the objectives of the Criminal Code, which therein groups 
the objectivity of all protected objects under one title; whereas sec. 7, in defining 
Crime, divides these protected objects into two distinct parts with the very strict 
and strong conjunction (translated poorly) as "as well as". The first part 
concerns acts involving certain material objectivity broken down into separate 
distinct departments, while the second part mentions any acts (socially 
dangerous) that encroach against 'legal order' -- a very normative doctrine. 
Thus, in a certain manner one here notes an interesting 'Carrara-Yescheck' 
theoretical combination having a very explicit positive manifestation. Such a 
situation is absent in many Continental Codes such as those of Austria and 
Malta which opt for only a procedural concept defining crime or the criminal 
act as eg. that act prosecuted by the courts of criminal jurisdiction (s.3.2.); 
a public action vested in the Government by whom it is prosecuted ( 4 .1.); and 
whereby a certain punishment of the offender is demanded. (7 .1; 3. 2) 
Thus, although objectivity and harm are essential for the definition of crime 
in the Maltese legal system, these are left undefined and confined only within 
a structural concept of crime. 12 The objective mate'rial element of social 
danger is the more underlined, on the other hand, by the Russian Code which 
besides the explicit sec. 1 and sec. 7, again underlines that an act, even if 
formally it answers to a crime-composition as provided by the special part of 
the Code, is nevertheless not included in the definition of a criminal act if due 
to its small significance it does not present any social danger. 13 Thus the 
formal elements are not enough to qualify an act as a criminal act. The 
significance 'level' is decided on the basis of all actual and factual events and 
circumstances composing the case--character of the act, conditions and means 
of completion and committion, the absence of harmful results, insignificant 
damage, together with the important qualification that the actor did not intend 
otherwise. 
The crime and its elements, presuppose that the act is one capable of or 
has in fact caused a social danger. The legislator sometimes directly links given 
elements of offences with the causing of definite particular harmful 
consequences. In fact the unlawfulness of the act, its socially harmful 
consequences and a causal connection between these constitute the objective 
side of the offence. ... 
The Soviet school differentiates between the concept of social danger and 
of social harm. Social harm appertians more specifically to civil, administrative, 
disciplinary "and similar ... " offences and unlike 'crime' does not always 
man if est the required level of danger to society in general. 15
Thus, to conclude this part one may recapitulate by stating that the Soviet 
school recognises four constituent elements of criminality--social danger, unlaw 
fulness, guilt, and penal sanctions. These elements of criminality are not to 
be confused with the structural units of the crime-composition i.e. a) object 
of the crime; b) subject of the crime; c) objective side of the crime (act, omission, 
results); d) subjective side of the crime (mens rea, motive and objective). 
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The positivization of certain classical concepts (supra) has caused a very 
important critique from the Italian school although as we have already seen 
those concepts in fact stem from the very same school. Thus, Pagliaro A. and 
Tran china G., say that "... le definizioni sostanziali del reato dettate da 
orientamenti politici sono gravement pericolose per la liberta individuale, 
quando tendano a sostituirsi alla legge o ad estenderne le incriminazioni. Esse 
comportono infatti, una decisa rottura del principio di certezza del diritto, in 
quanto concetti estremamenti vaghi, come quello di "tradimento rispetto agli 
ideali della comunita" o l'altro di "fatto pericoloso per ii sistema socialista" 
possono essere determinati di volta in volta in modo di verso ... ''. 10 
Although agreeing with the emminent jurist, the author of this essay has 
to underline and note that these substantial definitions derive directly from 
the classical school of legal thought amongst which Carrara and Manzini's 
theories were fundamental and whose theories inform modern Italian and 
Maltese legal thought. The difference being that the Soviet legislator opted 
for these concepts' positive enactment. 
The Soviet Russian Code defines its enforcement framework within space 
and time. The Code bases its provisions on the territorial principle for all crimes 
committed within RSFSR territory ( s .4) and in the opinion of the author on 
an extreme interpretation of the personal theory for crimes committed by USSR 
citizens outside USSR territory. 
One may recollect that Maltese law provides for the territorial principle 
in s.5 and even gives a differential definition of such territorial jurisdiction i.e. 
territory, sea, space, ship, vessel. The same Maltese Code narrows the personal 
theory for certain crimes and integrates this to the 'nationality' principle 
( citizenship and residence). Thus, a criminal action may be prosecuted in Malta 
against any citizen of Malta or permanent resident in Malta who becomes guilty 
of specified offences including those against the person of a citizen or permanent 
resident of Maha. Russian law does not differentiate territorial aspects of 
territorial jurisdiction. It gives a general dictum for all crimes committed within 
USSR territory without feeling the necessity of defining the various aspects 
of territory presumably because it is recognised that territorial jurisdiction 
explicitly means and includes territory, sea, air-space, vessels, aircraft etc. 
S. 4 deals also with the criminal liability of diplomatic representatives and
other citizens enjoying immunity. The Code provides that such questions are 
to be based on the ex territorial principle and is to be solved through diplomatic 
channels. ,; 
Due to its federal system, one can understand the difference of the territory 
defined in s.4 and s.5.S.4. speaks of crimes within the RSFSR territory (which 
is the territory of one republic in the fifteen republic federation) and is not 
applicable to other republics. S.5 concerns the liability of all USSR citizens 
committing a crime in foreign states who are triable in the RSFSR if brought 
to trial within RSFSR territory. On the other hand, s.4 applies to all citizens 
(RSFSR and all other citizens of other USSR republics, foreign citizens and 
state-less persons, if their criminal act is committed within RSFSR territory). 
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One should not forget that all republic citizens are USSR citizens. 
The territorial parameters are clearly defined in the 'Law on State Frontiers 
USSR, 1982'. This includes land territory, internal waters, internal sea waters, 
territorial waters ( 12 miles), frontier rivers and lakes up to the differentiating 
line, air�space, military ships, civil ships on the high seas, air ships. 
Foreign military ships situated in territorial waters of the USSR are 
recognised as not appertaining to USSR territory. 
The crime committed within RSFSR territory is defined as being either 
that activity the criminal quality of which commenced and was consumated 
in RSFSR territory; or when the result of criminal acts committed outside 
RSFSR or USSR territory happens within RSFSR territory, or in cases where 
although the criminal acts commenced within RSFSR territory the results ensue 
outside such territory. The latter case can be found in the Maltese Code with 
respect to the result of death outside Maltese jurisdiction of a person striken 
within such jurisdiction (s.211.3); and also s.220.3 concerning grievous bodily 
harm from which death ensues. 
As to s.5, it is Soviet law that is to determine and define acts committed 
outside Soviet jurisdiction by USSR citizens as criminal acts. The third para. 
of sec.5 explicitly negates the 'ne bis in infidem' principle previously admitted 
by the Maltese Code sec. 5. 
An application of the 'ne bis in idem' by Soviet law may be possible only 
by an express court decision. This gives very wide powers to the court in each 
specific case. But in principle, criminal liability and proceedings against USSR 
citizens continue their effectivity independently if whether the offender has 
already been convicted, or has already served his sentence. A very interesting 
provision of this same sec. 5 is the last para., providing for the application of 
international legal norms stemming from international treaties in case of 
criminal liability under Soviet law for crimes committed by foreign citizens 
outside USSR territory. Examples of such treaties include the 1973 International 
Convention on Apartheid. This provides for the cosmopolitan doctrinal attitude 
for defined criminal acts. This provision is a domestic legal crystallisation of 
the cosmopolitan school of law and is applicable to crimes against peace and 
humanity, military crimes
> 
terrorism etc. 
It is important to clarify that this provision is applicabl� only where the 
international convention provides for the competence of the courts of any state­
signatory/member of the particular agreement. Foreign citizens are liable only 
for those crimes committed outside USSR territory which are so provided for 
by Soviet criminal law. 
Differing from some other European Codes, the RSFSR Code provides 
for the transitory principle of law. The RSFSR Code sec. 6 expressly states 
that criminality and punishability are determined by the law in force at the 
time of committing the criminal act. 
Extenuation and exclusion of punishability have in determined 
circumstances a retroactive character. This is in line with Roman and 
Continental law. Ulpian, one may recall, wrote that wrongs should not be 
subjected to the punishment imposed by law in force at the time of trial but 
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to the punishment prescribed by the law in force at the time of the commission 
of the wrong. 18 But furthermore 'lex non habet oculos retro' and other 
Roman law provisions declare similar provisions; this applies to laws 
establishing punishment or aggravating punishment as in most systems of law. 
The Soviet school of law believes that it is not correct to punish a person for 
acts which previously were defined as criminal but which at the time of trial 
have either partly or completely lost their dangerous character, thus having 
a new penal status. 
Sec. 6 is integrally linked to the constitutional provision in art. 160 stating 
that "No one may be adjudged guilty of a crime and subjected to punishment 
as a criminal except by the sentence of a court and in conformity with the law.'' 
This provision is enhanced by sec.6 of the Code underlini_ng that an act may 
be qualified as criminal only in conformity t9 positive law and if so defined 
during the moment of commission of the wrong. Thus, the Russian provision 
manifests the generally accepted norm that wrongs should not be subjected 
to the punishment imposed by law at the time of trial but to the punishment 
prescribed by law at the time of the commission of the wrong. 
Thus the first part of sec. 6 finds a reflection in the Maltese Constitution 
sec.39.8'' ... No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on account 
of any act or omission that did not at the time it took place, constitute such 
an offence ... ''. This is in fact a manifestation of the principle null um crimen, 
nulla poena sine lege. Soviet law knows cases in which the principle of retroactive 
application of entenuating circumstances was limited in its operation. Thus 
the newly enacted law providing for the maximum period of fifteen years 
deprivation of liberty was not to apply for special grave crimes and for special 
dangerous recidivists convicted before the passing the passing of the 
Fundamental Criminal Legislation. The retroactivity of extenuation or exclusion 
provisions found in the second part of the RSFSR Code Sec. 6 is essentially 
found also in sec. 27 of the Maltese Code '' ... if the punishment provided by 
the law in force at the time of trial is different from that provided by the law 
in force at the time when the offence was committed, the less severe kind of 
punishment shall be awarded.". 
Soviet law established the moment of the consumation of the particular 
crime as the essential point of reference in order to determine whether the new 
or old law is to be applicable. Thus the moment of the coming into force of 
the new law is regarded in reference to the moment of the final act of the crime. 
Of course this holds good except for those situations that are afforded 
retroactivity according to sec.6. 
The application of retroactivity is a mandatory one for the courts. 
Investigating personel and inquiry organs may stop the proceedings subject 
to agreement with the public prosecutor. 
Soviet law as above stated recognizes cases in which the principle of 
retroactivity was not applied i.e. in which the extenuating provision was limited 
in its operation. Thus, the RSFSR Criminal Code provided a maximum period 
for deprivation of liberty for special grave crimes and for specially dangerous 
recidivists-fifteen years substituted the previous twenty five. But sec� 2 of the 
Law concerning the confirmation of the RSFSR Criminal Code, 27th October 
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1960 states that this particular section, i.e. sec. 24 does not apply or rather 
is not applicable to persons convicted before the enactment of the Fundamental 
Criminal Legislation if the conviction included special, dangerous state crimes, 
banditry, intentional homicide with aggravating circumstances and other grave 
crimes. This limitation was qualified by the provision that this only concerns 
sentences and. court decisions that came into force before the coming into effect 
of the RSFSR 1960 Code. 
It thus, seems that Soviet law, like Italian law, maintains that repeal should 
have the effect of cancelling the effects of conviction and of remitting any 
unexpired or outstanding portion of the sentence or penalty after the offender 
has already been tried and sentenced. 19 
'Minor' is defined by the RSFSR Code as a person under 16 years of 
age. As a protection to the minor, Soviet law defines a criminal act against 
such a person as involving an aggravating circumstance including in some cases 
a specially grave' punishability. 
The 16 year limit is the general age limit defining a minor in sec. 10. Yet, 
the same section establishes a 14 year limit for liability involving certain specified 
crimes. There are certain grave criminal acts whose character the Criminal 
Code believes the minor is capable of understanding and comprehending-wilful 
homicide, intentional �nd grave bodily harm, rape, theft, extreme hooliganism, 
grave crimes against the state and against social and personal property are some 
examples. 
When the minor is the active agent of a criminal act, the RSFSR Code 
establishes a special procedure of certain qualified norms in determining 
punishment and the circumstances necessary for exemption. 
Like Italian law, Russian law, possibly under the influence of sociological 
legal concepts, believes that "nei confronti dei minori, dunque la pena ha 
perduto quasi del tutto il carattere di castigo o di espiazione, per assumere 
una funzione di prevenzione sociale e di rieducazione ... ''. 20 This is based on 
the well accepted attitude that there is the ''prezunzione assoluta di assenza 
di capacita di intendere e di volere'' within the age limit as qualified and 
differentiated by law. 
This age differentiation, is regarded as a privilege granted for the reasons 
above mentioned and it is further complemented by the fact that Russian law 
holds that in such cases the minor had acted in such a manner by reason of 
his intellectually retarded capabilities (not in any way connected to insanity). 
In case of such a court determination which also takes into account the gravity 
of the act, the court may apply the norms related to disciplinary educative 
measures. This is also applied when, in relation to a person who is under 
eighteen years of age, the Court is satisfied that the criminal act is not one 
of grave social danger and that such a minor can be corrected without applying 
any penal procedure. 
The Court has a positive obligation determined by sec. 32 of the 
Fundamentals which states that it has to subject punishment to the objectives 
and principles of correction and positive up-bringing. 
Until the eighteen year limit a person is deemed to be under a special 
type of protection and 'status'. The eighteen year limit, for example, implies 
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that such a person, although fully responsible as from his 16th year, cannot 
be subjected to capital punishment; nor can his loss of personal liberty exceed 
ten years. Such persons have the 'privilege' to be granted a special form of 
conditional liberty and/or a possible subsequent change 'in punishment. 
All this, one may repeat, depends on the court's estimation of the social 
danger manifested by the minor's act and of the minor's character. This is 
similar to the other Italian doctrine which underlines that "se ii soggetto e 
socialmente pericoloso, gli saranno inflitte le misure di sicurezza del riformatorio 
guidiziario o della liberta vigilita". 21 Similar but not identical, it may be 
useful to recall that Italian law while defining the 14 year limit as one composed 
of absolute 'doli incapax' like the Russian Code, it defines the 14 - 18 year 
period as one involving the principle of diminished responsibility. Maltese law 
defines the 'doli incapax' as an element applicable to a 9 year limit. It 
conditionally grants the same regime to the 14 year limit if the act is "done 
without mischievous discretion". The 14 - 18 year old period is deemed to 
be 'doli capax' but involves an extenuation of punishment (1 - 2) due to the 
privileged treatment afforded. 
Sec. 2 speaks of exemption from criminal responsibility; and as in other 
sections, the Soviet legislator deems it important to define same, unlike his 
Maltese collegue. This is defined as a situation in which a person at the time 
of the perpetration of a socially dangerous act could not give an account of 
his actions or control them, either due to a chronic mental disease, or tu a 
temporary disarray of mental activity, imbecility or other unhealthy condition. 
This definition is important since like the Italian variant, and unlike the 
undefined Maltese version the fact· that '' il vizio di mente deve essere la 
conseguenza di una malattia" is explicitly enacted. 22 The author must here 
underline that the Russian section is not implying "ogni deviazione nel 
funzionamente normali" as Pannain interprets the Italian version. 
Russian law differentiates between two closely interacting conditions i.e. 
medical and juridical criteria both of which are necessary in establishing the 
exemption from responsibility. 
The medical criteria includes the objective presence of mental disease 
within the limits imposed by sec.2 i.e. chronic mental disease, temporary 
disarray of mental activity, imbecility and other unhealthy condition. 
The first one ( eg. schizophrenia, epilepsy) has to be of a grave and of a 
relatively uncurable character, of a protracted type and to have a deteriorating 
tendency. 
Temporary disarray (eg. pathological intoxication, alcoholic psychosis, 
mental shock) has to be qualified as a psychological disease which is of a short 
duration and has the possibility of cure or betterment. Imbecility is a complete 
intellectual lesion, a psychic defect. It hinders a correct evaluation of one'.s 
actions and disturbs an objective appreciation of events. This disease is classified 
either as being from birth or as having progressively developed during 
childhood. Examples are, idiotism, imbecility, and debility. Here exemption 
is not of an automatic nature. 
The last aspect i.e. 'other unhealthy conditions' is meant to include only 
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chose grave defects or diseases which may violate the person's psychological 
activity and does not necessarily and solely imply completeness of the sickness 
concerned. Thus, one may here include psychological changes caused by deaf­
muteness, psychopathy, and mental disorders caused by infectous diseases. The 
medical criteria is not enough to determine the exemption status of the offender. 
Besides this, the RSFSR Code, like Italian law, differentiates between the 
juridical criteria's elements i.e. the accounting capability and the controlling 
capability, '' ... could not give account . . . or control them ... ''. Both these 
elements are separated by an 'OR' due to the now well accepted fact that there 
are mental diseases which exclude the capacity of 'intendere' and 'volere' as 
in insanity but there is a majority of mental situations which exclude either 
the 'intendere' or the 'volere'. Thus, imbecillita, cretinismo, demenza are 
defined, at least by Italian law, as appertaining to the former, while peromania 
cleptomania and related diseases, to the latter. 
This juridical side thus constitutes an intellectual side i.e. the inability 
to account for one's acts, and a volitional side i.e. the inability to control same. 
The juridical aspect requires one of these aspects. The inability to account for, 
is interpreted by Russian law as an inability either to know, to realise the nexus 
between behaviour and the corresponding results or the inability to realise the 
socially dangerous character of behaviour. 
The inability to control one's acts is understood as an inability due to 
disease to act otherwise, even if the person knows of the dangerous character 
of his acts. 
Differing from the Italian school, neither Russian law nor Maltese law 
explicitly provide for 'visio parziale' and for a corresponding level of diminished 
respOf!Sibility. 
Hence, Russian law, as most systems of Continental law, recognises 
'' insanity as an excuse not only when it deprives the victim of his power of 
distinguishing the physical and moral nature and quality of his act charged 
as an offence, but also when it deprives him of his faculty of choice so as to 
exclude a free determination of his will in relation to those acts ... ''. 24
This may make us conclude that Russian law does not like Italian and 
Maltese law, admit of the doctrine of F euerbach and Metzger who qualify these 
"iolations of law as rea independently of their punishabilty· or otherwise. 
According to Russian law, this forms the theoretical basis for the 
application of compulsory measures of a medical character which conceptually 
are differentiated from the concept of 'punishment' (sec.58-61 ). These measures 
are applicable only to persons suffering from defective psychological elements. 
Thus, these measures cannot be applied to persons qualified as suffering from 
sec.2 qualification re: " ... other unhealthy conditions". 
This attitude seems to be different from the concept of '' custodia 
aggiuntiva" in Italian law or that of "strict custody" in Maltese law, which 
debatably seems to consider strict custody as a substitute to punishment. 25
Para. 2 of this section makes interesting reading since it positively enacts 
that a person committing a criminal act while in a state of liability will not 
be subject to punishment ( note the difference--to punishment and not to criminal 
liability as in the first paragraph) if he becomes mentally sick or suffers from 
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such a disease before the pronouncement of sentence. In such situations Russian 
·1aw here recognises the possibility of suspended proceedings. 
Such a person will be 'afforded' the same compulsory measures of a medical 
character. The difference here consists in the fact that if such a person is cured 
he may be liable to punishment. 
A direct minute provision in sec. 12, states that a person committing a 
crime while in a state of alcoholic intoxicaiton (drunkenness) is not exempt 
from criminal liability. This specific type of intoxication is not included in sec. 
38 which qualifies circumstances having extenuating or diminishing 
responsibility. On the contrary, as in the old English law this situation is 
included as a possible, facultative aggravating estimation. According to the 
'Commentary' the Soviet legislator is providing for the physiological or simple 
alcoholic intoxication which is differentiated from the pathological. The former 
is deemed to have that required psychological link with the surrounding 
circumstances and events. Aggression and extreme, acute reactions caused by 
this normal, simple intoxication is, according to Soviet law, still within the 
sphere of consciousness and volition. In fact Soviet law, like Italian law, believes 
that one should not admit any exemptive effect especially when intoxication 
is voluntary and thus the cause has its origins in a voluntary misconduct. The 
Russian section does not positively distinguish between accidental and 
voluntary, habitual or pre-determined situations as does Italian law. It only 
. . 
gives one genenc prov1s1on. 
The Soviet school of law defines alcoholic intoxication as a psychological 
situation created by the intake of alcohol, and is manifested by a depression 
of the person's capacity to account for his actions or to control them. Note 
the word 'depression'. Russian law does not express a clear provision for cases 
defined by Italian law as accidental i.e. '' ... Ricorre quando al soggetto che 
si e ubria cato non si puo rivolgere rimprovero, neppure di semplice leggerezza 
per tale suo stato . .. :?ti. Neither does it, at least explicitly, provide for 
situations caused by the "malicious or negligent act of another person ... " as 
the Maltese Code does. 
Russian positive law seems to find common ground with Italian law only 
in ubriachezza volontaria when '' ... essa si verifica non solo quando l' agente 
ha voluto ubriacarsi ma anche quando lo ha fatto per imprudenza o 
negligenza''. :?i 
Drunkenness is also included as an aggravating circumstance when it is 
'present' in the performance of an official or professional duty, or when the 
person concerned is performing a function qualified as connected with a source 
of extreme danger. Unlike Maltese or Italian law the latter of which 
differentiates between accidentale parziale, volontaria, preordinata abituale, 
cronica. The Soviet court in certain circumstances has a wide latitude and power 
to consider intoxication as aggravating or not. 
As in many countries, Soviet law applies these provisions related to alcohol 
intoxication also to conditions caused by the intakes of narcotics or exciting 
drugs. 
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The Code section itself does not mention narcotic intoxication; but persons 
under the influence of narcotics (stupefacenti and narcotici) are not exempted 
from criminal liability. Although in certain cases the above mentioned medical 
measures are applied as in other cases touching on the 'insanity' border, the 
court has the power to declare such persons as persons possessing limited 
capability and thus subjects them to a special guardianship regime and 
procedures. 28 
The Soviet legal doctrine of 'defence' as a basis exempting liability (infra) 
is, as in Italian law, applicable to all acts. Thus, the provision concerning 
'defence' is included in the general part of the Code under the title of 'necessary 
defence'. One may recall that the Maltese Code provides for 'legitimate defence' 
only in connection to homicide and bodily harm, implying a rather restrictive 
attitude permitting the notion of defence only within a framework of personal 
injuries: although one must underline that case-law seems to extend such effects 
to other offences. 29
The RSFSR section 13 starts by underlining the absence .of a criminal 
act in such cases. In other words an act falling under the elements as envisaged 
by the Special Part of the Code but committed in 'necessary defence' is not 
a criminal act, i.e. it is not a question of exemption· from liability as in other 
cases, but a negation of the criminality of the act. One finds the same position 
in the Maltese Code, " ... No offence is committed ... ". 
Thus, although there exists a difference of opinion, the author believes 
that 'necessary defence' in RSFSR law is not a situation exempting from 
criminal liability or from punishability, with the violation remaining a 'rea' 
as in the Metzger theory, but on the contrary, an act which cannot be defined 
as a criminal act. This is essentially different from being non-punishable as 
for example in Sec. 52 of the Italian Code. 
Soviet criminal legislature has many times qualified necessary defence as 
being socially beneficial and qualifies such an act as a subjective right directed 
towards one's defence and towards the defence of social interests. Besides being 
a subjective right, Soviet law sees necessary defence as a moral duty and 
obligation of each citizen and for certain specified officials responsible for the 
protection of public order, property etc., necessary defence is a juridicial 
obligation, the non-fulfilment of which gives rise to criminal liability. 
Sec. 13 defines necessary defence as being defence in protecting the interests 
of the Soviet State, social interests, interests of the person. This section also 
includes defence of the rights of persons defending, as well as defence from 
socially dangerous encroachments. 
This wide qualification, of course manifests the Soviet doctrine's attitude 
in believing that 'necessary defence' is not only a factor of personality, but 
is itself a social-legal institute creating a 'sui generis' legal call for activity in 
the fight against criminality. 30 One must here underline that although 
necessary defence is not only a right but a moral obligation calling each citizen 
to act against anti-social violations and to assist in the defence and protection 
of the public and social order (v. USSR Constitution s.65) the Code does not 
establish any legal liability if a person refuses to act accordingly. 
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Thus, RSFSR law provides that within the notional parameters of this 
section, the offence requiring 'lawful defence' action includes not only acts which 
are directed against 'rights' but also includes offences committed by acts directed 
against the State's interests, social interests and against the interest of the person. 
Although this may sound too ideologically burdened, one should compare 
and recall that the Italian school of law provides that "oggetto dell' offesa deve 
essere un 'diritto' ... "including thereto a 'diritto proprio' and 'diritto altrui'. 
Interesting enough, according to Italian doctrine 'diritto altrui' implies also
a right that may not at the moment of the act be recognised as such. 31 This 
expansive interpretation of right approaches the concept of 'interest' in Soviet 
law although this has, in the opinion of the author a rather more expansive 
nature, enabling the court (to have the possibility) to qualify and disqualify 
any criteria it deems fit or unfit for the definition of 'necessary defence'. 
Both Maltese and Italian law qualify that the offence has to be of an unjust 
and unlawful character, '' ... cioe contraria ai precetti dell'ordinamento 
giuridico ... ''. 32 This unlawfulness is only implied by the RSFSR Code 
definition by means of the words 'socially dangerous encroachments' as inserted 
in the structure defining the situations in which 'necessary defence', is lawfuL 
The absence and the qualification of the word 'unlawful' may on the one hand 
cause a certain confusion with the concept of 'jus necessitatis' (infra) and on 
the other hand implies that this section may not cater for cases in which an 
offence may be tolerated although not positively provided for. In fact, court 
case-law and criminal law doctrine have established certain criteria in defining 
'lawfulness' of the defence. Soviet law has differentiated between those 
conditions constituting lawfulness, as those that are related to the offence itself, 
and those conditions related to the defence proper: the former included the 
notions of 'social-political essence', 'time' and 'reality-actuality' of the offence. 
Thus an offence has to be of a socially dangerous character causing harm to 
the interests enlisted in sec.13. This element implies that such an offence may 
not necessarily be of an illegal (unlawful), character or burdened by the 'mens 
rea' in order to bring into effect section 13. This means that 'necessary defence' 
is permitted against offences committed by non responsible persons, by minors 
for example. Further, this attitude implies that sec.13 is effective even against 
'encroachments' which have the necessary elements qualifying the act as 
criminal missing. One must here mention the fact that this above mentioned 
interpretation has strict qualifications. 
The offence has to be of an immediate character, i.e. the objects provided 
for are subject to harm or a real, direct, immediate threat is created. 'Necessary 
defence' is not admitted in cases other than those having the 'sudden' and 
'immediate' character. Neither is it admitted if it is called to before any such 
offence had been committed, nor if the act is an act of lawful correction or 
of a performance of duty. 
The offence or encroachment has to be real. This means that there must 
exist circumstances which together form an objective reality of the offence and 
not just or simply existing in the imagination of the person defending. Although 
this seems to be contradicting the subjective theory (proclaiming, as i'n Maltese 
law that in deciding whether there was actual necessity of self-defence, the test 
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should be subjective. The danger against which the accused reacted should 
be viewed not necessarily as it was in truth and in fact, but rather as he saw 
it at the time), Soviet law recognizes the notion of 'apparent defence', which 
may lead to negligence or to exemption from liability--depending on the 
circumstances of the particular case. 
The latter differentiation i.e. conditions of lawfulness realted to the defence 
is concerned with the volume of the protected interests, the re�ationship between 
the defence and the offence and the protection of persons who may become 
victims of the caused harm. 
Thus all citizens have the right to protect and defend the qualified interests 
as in sec. 13 independently of whether such offences are directed against the 
defending person, or against the state interests or against other persons. This 
is subject to the condition that the act of defence must be directed solely at 
the offender and any harm caused must be caused to the same. 
The third condition in this paragraph concerns the principle of 
proportionality which is explicitly stated in the last sub-para. of sec.13. This 
section recognises only an explicit, clear disproportionality between the character 
of the defence applied and the character of the offence's danger as qualifying 
for the definition of 'excess of the limits of necessary defence'. It is interesting 
to note that an excess of such limits may be recognised as a circumstance 
diminishing the responsibility. 33
Before concluding our discussion concerning sec. 13 it is important to note 
that whereas the Maltese and Italian Codes speak of '' imposed by actual 
necessity" and "per esservi stato costretto dalla necessita", respectively the 
RSFSR provision does not positively speak of such necessity. This may in fact 
create a debatable ground concerning questions bordering between 'necessity' 
and 'provocation'. This problem is enhanced by the fact that the first part of 
sec. 13 (re: protected interests) seems to cater for cases which are caused or 
created by the agent's own initiative, this being directed towards the protection 
or defence of the section's qualified interests (state, social, person). In fact 
Saharov A.B. states that necessary defence is permissable in any cases of socially 
dangerous character which are threatening the above mentioned interests and 
rights, and can also be of a preventive nature against socially dangerous acts 
which have not yet formed the corresponding necessary crime composition i.e. 
have not yet become crimes. This is a dangerously expansive interpretation 
and the element of 'actuality' is underminded (supra). 'Actuality', although difficult 
to define in the first part of the section is recognised by Soviet law as being 
the actuality of danger as in Italian law--il pericolo deve essere attuale, presente 
o imminente-- but in Maltese law it is the necessity that must be actual. This
may of course be implied by the title of the section itself--necessary defence,
but a defence may be necessary without being actual, contrary it seems, to
the provision of 'jus necessitates' (infra).
The RSFSR Code, like the Italian Code, provides for 'jus necessitates', 
in sec. 14 and sec. 54 respectively. Under Maltese law the situation is debatable 
since'' ... it is essential in order that there may be exemptions from punishment, 
that the agent should have been constrained to the deed by an external force 
which he could not resist; the coercion must proceed from without ... '', although 
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as Mamo A., continues '' ... the court would take the extremity of the offender's 
situation into account by reducing the sentence". 34 Thus other impulsions 
may serve only to mitigate punishment but not to exclude liability altogether. 
Contrary to this, the RSFSR Code removes 'jus necessitatis' from the notion 
of crime. Thus, as in the case of 'necessary defence' the Code states that an 
act, even if it corresponds to the crime-composition as envisaged in the Special 
Part of the Code is not a criminal act if it is committed in a state of extreme 
necessity. 
An act is qualified as being committed under 'extreme necessity' when 
it is committed in order to eliminate a danger threatening the interests of the 
Soviet State, the interests of society and those of the person or threatening the 
rights of the person concerned or .those of other citizens. The elimination of 
the danger is subject to the fact that the danger within such circumstances could 
not have been eliminated by other means and if the harm caused by the defence 
is of a lesser significance or degree than the prevented harm. 
As in the 'necessary defence' provision we. again note in sec. 14 the 
dichotomy of 'community interests' and 'personal interests'. This is a radically 
expansive development of the classical doctrine of 'jus necessitates' which is 
restricted to when a person is '' ... costretto dalla necessita di salvare se o altri 
dal pericolo attuale ... " (Sec. 54 of the Italian Code). One must qualify the 
Italian definition since " ... danno grave alla persona non e da intendere in 
maniera ristretta, e doe con riferimento ai soli danni alla vita ed alla incolumita 
individuale, ma in senso piu ampio, e cioe con riferimento a tutti quei danni 
che possono incombere sulla persona ... ''. 39 This expansive interpretation of 
harm to the person was even further expanded by the Russian provision to 
include the interests of the State and the community. According to Soviet legal 
doctrine this institute affords citizens the necessary possibility to participate 
in the protection of the legal order in the cases where a conflict of leg� protective 
interests arises and in which the causing of harm to one side of these interests 
is the sole and only way to defend and protect the other more important and 
significant interests. 
The act, according .to Soviet and Italian law, has to be caused by the 
absolute necessity and if '' ii pericolo non sia altrimenti evitabile ... ''. Thus, 
the danger has to be actual. Here, actually permits probability and to make 
this clear, the Codice Zanardelli excluded the notion of 'pericolo imminente'. 
It is here that Soviet law differs from the Italian. Soviet legal doctrine provides 
that the danger must be already threatening. It must have already originated 
and has not ended. It must be actual and real. 
Soviet law provides for several sources of danger which may create a 
situation of extreme necessity-natural calamities; physiological and pathological 
processes; animal attack; sources of extreme danger in different mechanisms; 
the human causing, or threatening to cause, harm to legally protected interests; 
and others. 
Danger has to be real and not imaginary nor apparent. In the latter case 
criminal liability is excluded only when the person concerned errored in good 
faith and neither should nor could have foreseen that the danger was not real. 
In Italian law the 'stato di necessita' operates if the harm caused by the 
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defence is less or at least equal to the harm eliminated. The RSFSR Code 
provides only and exclusively for the former situation i.e. when the harm is 
of a lesser degree. Thus, according to Russian law, the harm caused has to 
be of a less grave character than the original harm to be eliminated. Contrary 
to the Antolisei's theory that the state is not interested in what 'particular' harm 
was caused, if at least an equal one is eliminated, the Russian provision shows 
that the state is interested, so much so that it provides only for those cases in 
which the harm caused is of a lesser degree and it does not provide for harm 
equality as does Italian law. The question of the relationship between the harm 
caused and the harm eliminated is a question of fact. Again, here the Soviet 
law has to take the social-political factor into account i.e. the social-political 
content of the interest harmed and the interest which was threatened by the 
danger. Soviet doctrine states that in balancing interests involving -life and 
property, life has to be given legal privilege. Since Soviet law does not admit 
of harm equality, it is an accepted and recognised fact that saving one's life 
by causing the death of another person is not accepted as a case of extreme 
necessity and is in fact a criminal act. 
Thus, one may conclude here that the causing of greater harm to eliminate 
a lesser harm or danger is qualified as an act having a dangerous social 
character. Furthermore, if the original harm is not eliminated, criminal liability 
subsists for the harm caused in trying to eliminate the former. The motive to 
eliminate harm is however accepted by Russian law as an element affording 
diminishing responsibility. 
The court has discretion in applying a latitude of possibilities when the 
harm caused to eliminate danger causes harm to third party's rights. Soviet 
doctrine underlines that sec. 14 is applicable to all citizens but it cannot be 
applicable to a c�rtain category of people in the performance of their duties 
as for example, military-service persons, police-executive, and others. 
The RSFSR Code does not speak of 'costringimento psichico' as does sec. 
54 of the Italian Code and in a certain sense section 33 of the Maltese Code 
as well and it is debatable (supra) whether the first part of sec. 14 may infer 
the possibility of application in a situation of need ''lo stato di bisogno'' as 
in Italian law. 
Sec. 15 of the RSFSR Code explicitly provides for criminal laibility for 
the preparation of a crime and for an attempt of the crime. The section positively 
separates both situations. It defines 'preparation' as the finding of the means 
or measures to be taken or the devicing of the means or instruments or the 
intentional creating of conditions for the criminal act. Punishment is provided 
in the Special Part of the Code. Thus, here the Soviet legislator's intention 
is radically different from that of the Continental. In fact 'preparation' in Soviet 
law is slightly similar to the provision given in Maltese section related to 
'conspiracy' (sec.57. 2). Preparation, in fact according to Soviet law includes 
for example, the working out, the devising of a common design (in complicity), 
the determination, the qualification of the p&sons, participants, members 
chosen and the participant's instigation and incitement. Although Maltese law 
does not recognize preparation as a criminal act, Maltese positive law seems 
linguistically to be accepting this attitude in relation to complicity: thus by 
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Maltese positive law a person shall be deemed to be an accomplice in a crime 
if he '' ... knowingly aids or abets the perpetrator or perpetrators of the crime 
in the acts by means of which the crime .is prepared or completed ... ''. 
This apparent contradiction was mitigated by Mamo A.' s assumption that 
in this case by the word 'preparation' is meant preparation which is followed 
at least by a commencement of the execution. This is a necessary attitude since 
according to Maltese law '' there cannot be complicity unless there has been 
at least an attempted offence ... ''. 36 
Now, to continue our discussion concerning attempt and preparatory acts. 
Russian law differentiates three main stages of the criminal 'iter' i.e. the 
preparatory stage, the attempt and the completion of the crime. These stages 
are recognised as such in crimes having an objective, and having present the 
notion of direct intention. 
Preparatory acts are defined by Russian law as those objective and 
subjective elements listed in the first part of the section which form per se an 
intentional behaviour of a socially dangerous character, which in itself creates 
the necessary conditions towards the subsequent committing of the crime. 
The RSFSR Code, like the Maltese Code is a certain respect, recognises 
that for particular acts, the above mentioned actions constitute in themselves 
independent compositions of other qualified crimes, as for example certain crime 
against the safety of the state, banditry, and others. According to Soviet law, 
in these latter crimes there is no possibility of attempt, since the preparatory 
stage overlaps with the crime completion. 
Similarly, Maltese law provides that the mere agre6ment on a mode of 
action whatsoever directed against the safety of government (sec.55,56) is a 
crime in itself, which is aggravated.by any preparatory measures taken for the 
carrying of the crime into effect. 
One must state that Soviet doctrine is conscious of the fact that the working 
out of a common design , the elimination of obstacles and all other acts directed 
to the creation of necessary conditions permitting the completion of the crime 
do not always create an immediate danger, neither may they be assumed to 
be establishing the actual presence of danger and furthermore do not as yet 
at such a stage form the substantial part of the crime-composition. But Soviet 
doctrine underlines that it is the existence of such acts that secures the necessary 
conditions for the consummation of the crime in question. Due to this fact and 
within such parameters determining the level of 'necessary conditions', the court 
is given powers to determine liability and punishment in cases that involve 
preparation. The court has to take account of the character and level of social 
danger created by such acts; the degree of consummation of the criminal intent 
and the causes preventing the completion of the crime. Thus, here within the 
notion of 'preparatory acts' the determining role in establishing liability is not 
only the degree of danger but the criminal intention present. 
Many authors believe that due to this relative exclusion of the difference 
between preparatory and executive acts Soviet law comes closer to the Italian 
provision regulating 'attempt'. 
Attempt is by the RSFSR Code defined as an intentional act immediately 
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directed towards the committing of the crime, if such a crime is not completed 
due to causes independent of the will of the offender. Thus attempt is that stage 
of activity of a criminal character having intentional encroachment as its basic 
element directed against an object which is protected by law, subsequently 
putting such an object in immediate danger of being harmed but stopping short 
of causing harm due to causes which do not depend on the will of the person 
concerned. According to Soviet doctrine the difference between preparatory 
acts and attempt is the fact that during the latter there is the development of 
an actual encroachment on a concrete object. This doctrinal explanation is close 
to the Maltese 'commencement of the execution of the ace but per se is left 
unprovided for by the provisions of the RSFSR Code. Furthermore Soviet law 
recognises the notion of completed and uncompleted attempt. 
The act within the concept of attempt is interpreted as being that act 
'immediateli directed towards the committing of the crime, which is provided 
for in the Special Part of the Code and part of the integral objective side of 
the criminal act. Another element of attempt is that such act must have put 
the object protected in immediate danger. 
As one can note, the RSFSR provision does not, positively provide for 
the 'idoneita' of the act as in Italian law (and not idoneita of the means as 
Mamo states). It seems that the former provides for teleological iter of the act, 
while the Italian provides for the "non equivocita" character of the acts. In 
fact the Italian Code speaks of the univocita and of the idoneita of the acts, 
the unequivoal and sufficient/suitability character of the acts. The author is 
inclined to believe that the Russian version of the words 'direct' and 'immediate' 
are in fact manifesting the element of 'univocita' but not necessarily 'idoneita' 
although this may be implied. 
In fact Italian positive law has counterbalanced its elimination of the 
difference between the preparatory act and the executive act by providing 
instead for the univocita of the acts determining the criminal intention. 
The author believes that the same situation can be inferred from the 
RSFSR provision. 37
The RSFSR Code, unlike the Maltese provision but similarly to the 1889 
Italian Code speaks only of "independent of the will' leaving out 'fortuita' 
for much the same reasons as those explained by Mamo A. Further, Italian 
positive law instead of providing for 'volonta' gives the positive qualification 
of "quando l'azione non si compie o l'evento no si verifica ... ", i.e. "qualunque 
causa tranne lo stesso recedere della volonta del soggetto dall' azione ... ''. 38 
Theoretically for Russian law, the punishment for a preparatory act and 
for attempt is the same as that of the completed crime. But case-law has shown 
that for the former a "less severe punishment" is inflicted. 
This equalization of liability seems to be unfair although the provision 
goes on to qualify that in inflicting the punishment the court is bound to take 
into consideration the character and degree of social danger of the acts 
committed, the degree or rather the level of the achieved criminal intent and 
the causes that hindered and prevented the completion of the crime. 
This aspect if analysed on a theoretical level conflicts with sec. 4:9 of the 
Italian Code which provides for an exemption of punishment ex conditio Jure 
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and with the implied position of exemption of punishment in cases of the use 
of impossible means in attempt. In practice the expression 'socially dangerous
act' may help to extenuate the punishment in Soviet la�, but also having a
dangerous nuance. 
Voluntary desistence (sec. 16) is provided for by a separated section. It 
is substantially similar to the Maltese and Italian provisions: a person who 
voluntarily desists from the completion of the crime is criminally liable only 
if the factually committed acts form a crime composition of a different crime. 
The formulation here has created an anomaly in the sense that it gives the 
impression that a person voluntarily desisting may be liable for this attempted 
crime if the acts committed by him do form another different crime. 
Of course this may be only a linguistic anamoly since in reality the offender 
is liable only for the acts already committed and if these form the necessary 
crime-composition. Thus, if the factually committed acts do not form part of 
a positively defined crime, then, the offender is exempt from liability. As in 
Italian law, '' ... nei casi di desistenza volontaria ... il colpevole soggiace soltanto 
alla pena per gli atti compiuti, qualora questi constituiscono per se un reato 
di verso,'. :w which seems to be the source of the Russian provision. 
By 'voluntarily', Soviet law understands a final discretion in the desistance 
from any acts directed towards the completion of the crime; an important 
element is the fact that the offender is conscious of the possibility of a successful 
result of his criminal act. If desistance is caused by the apparent impossibility 
to complete the crime, then the offender is still liable. This latter case is regarded 
by Soviet law as being of a forced desistance and not of a voluntarily character. 
As in Maltese law, motive plays no part in determining the existence of 
desistance. 
Although the objective side of this desistance is qualified as 'forbearance' 
or 'inaction' (i.e. a complete and final discontinuance of the already initiated 
acts directed towards a criminal activity), such forbearance is not always enough 
to bring about the exemption of liability. In case social dangerous consequences 
resulted from such acts, than a mere inaction will bring about liability. The 
desistance here has to take a very active form of action in order to prevent 
the birth of such results. This position is clear especially when one analyses 
'complicity': and 'inaction' by the instigator will not be enough to exempt him 
from liability subsequent to the crime committed by the principal--a direct active 
intervention to prevent the commission of the crime is necessary. 
Other crimes positively require a denouncement act in addition to the act 
of desistance. 
Soviet law accepts the juridical reason for impunity in these cases, basing 
its acceptance as does Maltese law, on the fact that the will "to commit the 
crime ... is negatived by a contrary determination of the same will of the agent 
... ''. And as in the above paragraph, one can see that the Soviet provision 
is very similar to the Maltese one in that the latter also includes forebearance 
from doing any further acts, as well.as the counter action directed to prevent 
any effects ensuing. 
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Like Italian and Maltese law, Soviet law recognises, though not positively 
the concept of 'recesso attivo' i.e. when "il colpevole ha condotto a termine 
l'attivita esecutiva e desiderando, per riflessioni o fatto sopraggiunto, evitare 
ii verificarsi dell' even to, agisce per im pedirlo ... ". 40
The difference from the Maltese position is that while the latter includes 
the counter action of the agent directed to undo the acts already done A. 
exempting from liability, the Italian and Soviet provisions "non import a 
l'impunita, ma solo una diminuzione della pena ... ". 
Complicity is defined in sec. 17 as the intentional joint participation of 
two or more persons in committing a crime. This is very similar to the Favata 
definition that '' ... concorso di persone nel reato si ha quando piu persone 
concorrono nel medesimo reato ... ". 41 
The Russian school of legal thought underlines that complicity includes 
(a) plurality of agents, (b) realisation of the objective element of crime as
envisaged in the special part of the Code, ( c) a casual link and 'contribution'
to the event, (d) the 'volonta' in participating, (e) the consciousness of
participating in a common design and ( f) the awareness of availing of the
common realisation.
Since, Soviet law like English law believes that a collaboration between 
persons or groups increases the danger of their actions, a crime committed in 
complicity is an aggravating circumstance (v.RSFSR Criminal Code s. 39). 
Subject to the totality of circumstances envisaged in the above six characteristics 
Soviet doctrine divides complicity into simple and complex. 
Simple complicity implies the activity of co-principals while complex 
complicity includes the different roles played by different agents i.e. principal, 
organiser, instigator, accomplice. All participants are linked to the principal 
by having a causal relationship to the crime. Thus, the accomplice assists the 
principal in the consummation of the crime, or the instigator strenghtens the 
principal's intention and desire while the organiser commands and organises 
the crime. Thus, sec. 17 establishes the liability of the principal together with 
the liability of those persons who, although do not commit directly the criminal 
act, create the necessary conditions for the principal's action. 
The persons involved are regarded as accomplices only if their action and 
the action of each is considered as being of social danger i.e. it plays an essential 
role in the criminal act or in the conclusion of the criminal result. Russian 
legal doctrine recognises that complicity may be composed of omission and 
comm1ss1on. 
Joint participation is defined by Russian doctrine as a material side of 
the act and includes--(a) the acts of each accomplice are necessary conditions 
for the actions committed by the others; (b) the criminal result is common and 
integral to all the accomplices; (c) the acts of each is integrally linked in a causal 
relationship to the common criminal result. 
The subjective side consists in the intention. As in Maltese law, legal 
responsibility is based on the 'mens rea' participation in committing a socially 
dangerous act having the crime-composition of a provision defined by law: 
Punishment is effected according to the level and characteristics peculiar 
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to the particular participation of the person per se. The court has to take account 
of the factual role and participation of each, the activity manifested by each 
and the persistence involved in the consummation of the act. Soviet law of 
complicity-punishment is based on an individualistic approach and hence sec. 
17 does not equalise, at least in a positive sense, the principal and the 
accomplices' liability as Maltese law does. On the contrary sec. 17 obliges the 
court to take into account the concrete and individual role of each participant. 
Soviet case-law accepts the principle that personal circumstances are not 
communicable. It also accepts as Maltese positive law does that any aggravation 
of crime can be imputable only to the person who commits the act. 
Sec. 17 recognises the following as co-participants to the crime: the 
principal, who is the person directly committing the crime; the organiser who 
is the person organising the committing of the crime or who leads/heads its 
commitment; and the instigator who is, the person who persuades; the 
accomplice, who is differentiated from co-participant is the person who promotes 
the crime by means of advices, instructions, allotment of means or by the 
elimination of impediments. The accomplice is also that person who prior to 
the act promises to harbour the criminal, the means used and the instruments 
used for the completion of the criminal act or to hide any tracks of the crime 
or the objects received or acquired by the criminal act. 
This section is also applicable to the corresponding sections related to (a) 
criminal group, (b) criminal organization, (c) criminal gang. (v. sec. 72-77). 
Soviet law, like Maltese law separates complicity from other acts which though 
being somewhat and even closely linked to the crime are not conditional for 
its commission and/or consummation, eg: concealment-harbouring, misprision, 
connivance. The latter two notions are provided for separately in sec. 18 and 
sec. 19. 
These provisions create liability only for cases specially provided for in 
the Special Part of the RSFSR Code. 
Sec. 18 (Harbouring-concealment) underlines that this section is applicable 
only for that concealment-habouring which was not promised prior to the crime, 
implying complicity-liability for such promise. This is similar to the Maltese 
and Italian position stating that '•if before the fact a promise is made of some 
help to be given after the fact then that promise becomes a form of complicity 
because it encourages the author to perpetrate the offence ... ''. 
For certain particular types of acts of complicity, RSFSR law like Italian 
law punishes the act of complicity not only when factual acts are implemented 
or a result ensues but also for the mere fact of appertaining to such an 
'organization'. This is also present in Maltese law especially in sec. 63-83 where 
the Code speaks of crimes against the public peace, in sec. 58 re:conspiracy 
and in sec. 83 concerning the promotion of political object by use or display 
of physical force. 
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